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RECENT DECISIONS CONCERNING THE
AGENCY SHOP
DELL BUSH JOHANNESEN*
Recently the National Labor Relations Board ruled' that the
agency shop was legal under section 8(a) (3) of the Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act2 and thereby reversed its prior decision in the
same case. Although the case did not involve any dispute about the
legality of the agency shop under the Indiana right to work law,4
the Board's decision left no doubt that where state right to work
provisions permit, the agency shop is a mandatory bargaining issue.
In a subsequent decision," the United States Supreme Court refused
to review a Kansas Supreme Court determination that an agency
shop provision in a collective bargaining agreement violated the
Kansas right to work constitutional amendment.6 In denying a
review, the Court indicated, as the NLRB had previously done, that
the legality of the agency shop under the various right to work pro-
visions is a matter for state determination. The legality of the
agency shop, however, is still unsettled; hence, the Court may yet
find itself deciding what has become a rather thorny union security
issue.
DEVELOPMENT OF THE AGENCY SHOP
The agency shop is somewhat similar to the union shop. How-
ever, although all employees in an agency shop arrangement must
pay union dues (and, in some agreements, initiation fees), they are
not required to join the union. In other words, the dues are a form
of service fee charged by the union for representing everyone in the
bargaining unit (as required by statute) 7 rather than just the union
members.
* Assistant Professor of Economics, University of North Carolina.
General Motors Corp., 133 N.L.R.B. No. 21 (Sept. 29, 1961).
'61 Stat. 140 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (3) (Supp. II,
1961).
' General Motors Corp., 130 N.L.R.B. 481 (1961).
'IND. ANN. STAT. § 40-2701 to -2706 (Supp. 1961).
' General Drivers Local 498 v. Higgins, 30 U.S.L. WEEK 3107 (U.S.
Oct. 10, 1961).
'KAN. CoNsT. art. 15, § 12.
"61 Stat. 143 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1958).
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The agency shop is not new," but did not gain widespread use
until recent years when it became a fairly successful device to out-
maneuver the increasing number of state-enacted right to work laws
outlawing union security devices.' It is commonly believed that
Justice Rand originated the agency shop in Ford Motor Co. of
Canada,10 an arbitration proceeding; however, there were agency
shop:provisions in, collective bargaining agreements in the United
States before World War II.
Although it has been alleged that "several such provisions came
into effect as early as 1942 under the auspices of the National War
Labor Board,""1 and that the War Labor Board "established pre-
cedence through -its directive decisions,"" the War Labor Board's
Reports indicate that the Board upheld such agency shop provisions
only where they, had been voluntarily agreed upon previously by the
parties 3 and the Board simply gave sanction to such agreements
through its directive orders. The Board's policy was stated clearly
in Southern Colorado Power Co. :1 the union is entitled to renewal
- ' One of the forerunners of the agency shop was the work permit system
used so extensively in the building and craft unions. In order to work, a
non-union man paid a fee to the union and was issued a permit to work on
a union job. He did not become a union member and when the job was
finished the permit expired. See McConkey, Was the Agency Shop Pre-
naturely Scrapped?., 9 LAB. L.J. 150 (1958). See also DEMPSEY, THE
OPERATION OF THE RIGHT TO WORx LAWS 42 (1961), stating that an agency
shop provision was prohibited under the 1934 amendment to the Railwork
Labor Act, § 2, ch. 691, 48 Stat. 1186 (1934) (amended by 62 Stat. 909
(1948), as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 152 (1958)).
* This type of union security has also been called by a variety of other
names: maintenance of dues payment, 26 LAB. ARB. REP. 956 (1956); sup-
port money clause, Public Service Co., 89 N.L.R.B. 418 (1950); bargaining
agen't fee, Spielmans, Bargaining Fee Versus Union Shop, IND. & LAB. REL.
REV. 609 (1957) ; universal check-off, McConkey, supra note 8, at 151 ; Randformula, Jones, The Agency Shop, 10 LAB. L.J. 781 (1959).I0 1 Lab. Arb. 439 (1946).
;1Jones, supra note 9, at 785.
"Ibid. Jones also refers to Federal Shipbuilding & Drydock Co., 1
W.L:R. 140 (1942), as an early agency shop decision by the War Labor
Board. Actually this case involved a maintenance of membership agreement
on which a number of employees reneged before the contract expired. The
action of the Board was simply ordering compliance with their pledge, and
the payment of delinquent dues so ordered was not in the nature of a fee for
bargaining services since it was predicated on the employees' voluntary
membership in the union as a condition of employment for the duration of
the contract.
"S The War Labor Board upheld agency shop provisions in the contracts
in Alexander Primes Co., 21 W.L.R. 219 (1945), Southern Colorado Power
Co., 18 W.L.R. 314 (1944), and Cambridge Tile Mfg. Co., 2 W.L.R. 271
(1942).
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of dontract provisi6ns requiring all employees, including non-union
members, to pay stipulated union dues to maintain the bargaining
agency, ,since the parties voluntarily agreed- to such a provision in a
prior contract, and it is established Board policy to extend union
ecurity provisions entered. into through collective bargaining. There
does not appear to be a single- instance in which ,the Board ordered
the inclusion of such provision in a collective agreement absent prior
agreement between the parties.
1VLRB Decisions Concerning the Agency Shop
The recent NLRB decision concerning the agency shop's legality
under the Labor Management Relations Act is notable on at least
iw6 counts. First, it is a fairly:rare occasion that the Board reviews
one of its decisions, and second, probably even rarer for it to reverse
one of its aeisons."' In the principal case, the Board ruled four-to-
one'that the'agency shop was 'lawful under the act. One influential
newspaper stated that "the vote by the board, which contains two
recent Kennedy appointees, reversed an earlier 3-2 decision of a
board dominated by Eisenhower men."' 5  Whether intentional or
not, this casts the Board's decision in an unfavorable light, making
it -appear more a. political decision' than one based on the facts in
relation to the law. The.Board's action, however, does not deserve
this kind of interpretation; as a brief teview of NLRB decisions con-
cerning the agency shop will disclose.
I The agency shop issue- was first squarely presented to the NLRB
in .1950 in Public Service Co. 6 , The contract between the company
and the union contained a suppprt money provision calling for pay-
ment of two dollars monthly to the union by everyone in the bar-
gaining unit. Petitioner Smith, having received notice from the
union that he was two months delinquent in his payments, sent a
check to the union for his back dues and initiation fee along with
his application for memb'ership in the union. 'Fbr undisclosed rea-
sons- Smith was denied membership and his initiation fee was re-
funded. Thereafter, Smith refused to make any more support money
payments and was subsequently discharged.
Since the proviso to section 8(a) (3) of the Labor Management
Relations Act'7 was controlling, the question involved was whether
5The Wall Street Journal, Oct. 2, 1961, p. 7, col.'2.
1G89 N.L.R.B. 418 (1950).1
,This proviso reads: "Provided, That nothing in this subchapter . . .
shall preclude an employer from making an agreement with a labor organi-
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the proviso to this section protected union security provisions other
than actual membership."8 The trial examiner applied the principle
that provisos are to be strictly construed and, thus, the proviso per-
mitted no alternative to membership. The Board did not agree. It
found the legislative intent of the proviso permissive rather than
exclusive, and that it was reasonable to infer that any agreement
legally consummated was immunized by the terms of the proviso,
including agreements affording varying measures of security to a
contracting labor organization, other than membership guarantees.
Since the act was expressly designed to promote equality in bargain-
ing power, to construe the term "membership" under the proviso as
denoting the sole requirement that a union could obtain in a contract
as a legitimate measure of security would restrict, rather than aid,
collective bargaining. The Board therefore concluded that it was
hardly likely that Congress could have intended that the bargaining
agent be successful in obtaining only the stronger forms of union
security (membership guarantees), and that lesser concessions on
the part of employers would not be accorded the protection of the
proviso.19
In 1952 the NLRB was confronted again with the agency shop
issue in American Seating Co." and again upheld the contract pro-
vision "because the legislative history of the amended Act indicates
that Congress intended not to illegalize the practice of obtaining
support payments from nonunion members who would otherwise be
'free riders' ... ."21 Here the Board made reference to Senator
Taft's statement before the Senate on April 23, 1947, concerning
the union shop:
[I]f the man is admitted to the union, and subsequently is
fired from the union for any reason other than nonpayment
of dues, then the employer shall not be required to fire that
man. In other words, what we do, in effect, is to say that no
one can get a free ride in such a shop. That meets one of the
zation . to require as a condition of employment membership therein on
or after the thirtieth day following the beginning of such employment or the
effective date of such agreement, which ever is later . . . ." 61 Stat. 140(1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (3) (Supp. II, 1961).
'a 89 N.L.R.B. at 420.
"' Id. at 423-24.




arguments for the union shop. The employee has to pay the
union dues. 2
These two decisions of the NLRB evidently settled the agency
shop issue insofar as its legality under the Labor Management Rela-
tions Act was concerned for no further cases came before the Board
until the recent Indiana case. Both the Public Service Co. case in
Colorado and the American Seating Co. case in Michigan arose in
jurisdictions not having right to work provisions. However, this
proved a complicating factor in the Indiana case which first came
before the Board in February 1961.
The Indiana Case
Although the right to work movement is purported to have
started with the Florida constitutional amendment in 1944," the real
impetus for such state action 4 was provided by section 14(b) of the
Labor Management Relations Act in 1947. This section permitted
state laws having more restrictive provisions regarding union se-
curity to take precedence over the federal statute.
In 1959 Meade Elec. Co. v. Hagberg5 presented the question
whether an agency shop under the Indiana right to work law26 was
permissible. The company contended that it was not since there
was no real difference between the payment of dues and actual mem-
bership in a labor organization.
Judge Kelley, writing for the Indiana Appellate Court, pointed
out that the language of the Indiana statute contained no prohibition
against the requirement of the payment of fees or charges to a labor
organization, but applied only to agreements requiring union mem-
bership as a condition of employment, and was not intended to outlaw
the agency shop. Noting that Indiana had enacted its law after most
2293 CONG. REc. 3837 (1947). See also id. at 3959; JOINT COMMITTrEE
ON LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS, 80TH CONG., 2D SEss., REPORT ON
LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS 52 (Comm. Print 1948).
22 Dempsey, op. cit. supra note 8, at 42. Also, Kansas enacted a statute
in 1943 providing that employees had the right to form, join and assist labor
organizations or to refrain from any or all such activities. KAN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. §44-803 (1950).
2 Twenty-three states enacted some form of right to work statute; four
of them later repealed (Delaware, 1959; Louisiana, 1956; Maine, 1948; New
Hampshire, 1949). Of the nineteen remaining state statutes, eleven have
specific provisions against forced payment of dues and fees to a labor or-
ganization. Indiana enacted its law in 1957. It contained no such prohibition.2 129 Ind. App. 631, 159 N.E.2d 408 (1959).
2 IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 40-2701 to -2706 (Supp. 1961).
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states had done so and that two distinct types of right to work
statutes then existed in this country," Judge Kelley reasoned that
had the Indiana legislature intended to make payments to unions
illegal it would have so provided in the statute.
Subsequent to this decision, the United Automobile Workers
asked General Motors Corporation to bargain concerning an agency
shop in its Indiana plants. General Motors declined. Thereafter,
the United Automobile Workers filed refusal to bargain charges
with the NLRB. In February 1961, the NLRB dismissed the
charges against General Motors with a bare majority opinion, three-
to-two,2" which upset prior Board decisions regarding the legality
of the agency shop under the Labor Management Relations Act.
Each of the three Board members forming the majority (Kimball,
Jenkins and Leedom, Chairman of the Board) applied different
reasoning. Kimball, taking the broadest position, stated that the
agency shop was not a permissible form of union security under the
act, whether or not the question arose in a right to work state.2
Jenkins stated that support money could be considered lawful only
if offered as an option to a valid contract provision requiring union
membership."0 Leedom stated that an agency shop arrangement,
whatever its status under Indiana law, could not be considered law-
ful under the act in a right to work state.3 ' Leedom further stated
that reliance by the General Counsel and the United Automobile
Workers upon prior Board decisions was misplaced since neither
case had arisen in a right to work jurisdiction. Therefore, there
was no legal impediment to preclude the parties from entering into
contracts requiring all employees to be union members, and they
made such contracts.3 2 In the instant case, however, the parties were
not free to so contract. They could not require membership as a
condition of employment, and, therefore, could not waive a right
they did not have to require a lesser form of union security.3
2 The distinction noted by Judge Kelley was that some state statutes ex-
pressly prohibited forced payment of dues and fees to a union. As pointed
out in note 24 supra the Indiana statute contained no provision either pro-
hibiting or permitting forced payment of dues or fees.
28 130 N.L.R.B. 481 (1961). 29Id. at 499.
Id. at 487. 1!d. at 485.
'
2 Id. at 486-87.
'8 The dissenting members, Fanning and Rogers, stated that the agency
shop was a legal form of union security under the act since that statute only
defines the maximum form of union security permissible and all lesser forms
are therefore clearly legal. Id. at 502. This dissent accords with the two prior
Board decisions. Public Service Co., 89 N.L.R.B. 418 (1950); American
Seating Co., 98 N.L.R.B. 800 (1952). See text at notes 16 and 20 supra.
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Shortly after this decision, President Kennedy appointed replace-
ments for two of the Board members. Kimball, whose term expired,
was succeeded by Frank W. McCulloch, who replaced Leedom as
chairman. Jenkins, who resigned to take a job on a regional board,
was succeeded by Gerald A. Brown. Immediately thereafter the
United Automobile Workers requested that the case be reopened
and that the Board reconsider its February decision.34 The Board
granted the request, and on September 29, 1961, reversed its Feb-
ruary decision, holding that the agency shop was legal under the
act. 5 The decision, however, does not apply to a situation in which
a state law has been interpreted by state courts as forbidding agency
shop clauses in union contracts.3"
The majority opinion, based on the dues delinquency proviso to
section 8(a) (3), cited the 1951 Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
decision in Union Starch & Ref. Co. v. NLRB. 7 In this case the
court upheld an NLRB ruling that a union cannot require anything
other than the payment of dues and fees as a condition of employ-
ment. Employees who were willing to pay their union dues and
initiation fees could not be required, under penalty of discharge,
to apply for union membership or participation in union activities.
The court said that Congress in writing the Labor Management
Relations Act intended to prevent utilization of union security agree-
ments for any purpose other than to compel payment of union dues
and fees. 8
The Board majority noted that it was never Congress' intention
to give non-union employees a free ride and that under an agency
shop agreement the individual employees would still have complete
freedom to decide whether to join a union." The Board ordered
General Motors to bargain with the United Automobile Workers on
the proposed agency shop in its nine Indiana plants.4" Although a
", See The Wall Street Journal, Oct. 2, 1961, p. 7, col. 2.
" 133 N.L.R.B. No. 21 (Sept. 29, 1961).
" State right to work provisions interpreted by their respective attorney
generals to preclude agency shop provisions: Kansas, Nebraska, Nevada,
North Carolina, North Dakota, South Dakota, and Texas. PH LAB. SERV.
46, 175 (1961).
7186 F.2d 1008 (7th Cir. 1951). 38 Id. at 1012.
"The sole dissenter, Leedom, contended that "for all practical purposes,
the very thing is achieved.., in a right to work state quite as effectively as
if the union contract expressly provided for union membership as a condition
of employment." 133 N.L.R.B. No. 21 (Sept. 29, 1961).
,o The plants are located in Anderson, Bedford, Kokomo, Indianapolis,
Marion and Muncie.
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Board decision is subject to appeal, both General Motors and the
United Automobile Workers had agreed prior to the Board's deter-
muination that they would accept it as final. Thus, there seems little
doubt, as far as the Board and section 8(a) (3) are concerned, that
the agency shop is a legal form of union security under the federal
statute. However, the Board did not decide whether section
14(b) 41 allows states to outlaw the agency shop.
The Kansas Case
Another phase of the controversy is exemplified by the Kansas
case, -42 which involved an agency shop clause in the Teamsters Local
498 contract with the Cardinal Manufacturing Company. A lower
state court upheld the agency shop provision under the broad lan-
guage of the Kansas right to work constitutional amendment. On
appeal to the Kansas Supreme Court, Justice Schroeder, writing the
majority opinion, noted that in the evolution of federal law on the
subject, the Wagner Act placed no restraints on compulsory union
membership under voluntary closed shop agreements. 8 The states,
however, were allowed to pursue their own more restrictive policies. 4
With the enactment of the Labor Management Relations Act, how-
ever, closed shops were made illegal and union shops were sanc-
tioned, but states were given the right under section 14(b) to enact
more restrictive statutes regarding union security which should take
precedence over the federal statute. Thus, in November 1958, Kan-
sas adopted a constitutional amendment which provided that em-
ployees had the right to work regardless of membership or non-
membership in a labor organization."
The union relied upon the Indiana decision, since neither the
Indiana statute nor the Kansas constitutional provision specifically
mention payments to a union. Justice Schroeder pointed out, how-
ever, that the Indiana law was a legislative enactment calling for a
different rule of construction than is ordinarily applied to constitu-
41 This section provides: "Nothing in this Act shall be construed as
authorizing the execution or application of agreements requiring membership
in a labor organization as a condition of employment in any State or Terri-
tory in which such execution or application is prohibited by State or Terri-
torial law." 61 Stat. 151 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 164(b) (1958).
" Higgins v. Cardinal Mfg. Co., 188 Kan. 11, 360 P.2d 456 (1961).
,Id. at - , 360 P.2d at 461.
"Ibid., citing Algoma Plywood & Veneer Co. v. Wisconsin Employment
Relation Bd., 336 U.S. 301 (1949).
" KAN. CoNsT. art. 15, § 12.
[Vol. 40
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tional amendments, and that it contained a penalty clause for non-
compliance. 6 In drafting the constitutional amendment, Justice
Schroeder stated, the Kansas legislature must have been fully aware
of the only enforceable criteria of membership recognized by the act,
i.e., the payment of dues and initiation fees. 7
Therefore.. . the expression "membership in a labor organi-
zation as a condition of employment" in section 14(b) of the
Taft-Hartley Act becomes synonymous with payment of
union dues and fees for enforcement purposes under the union-
security agreements so far as labor unions or employers are
concerned.48
The natural and logical interpretation of the Kansas con-
stitutional amendment, prohibiting compulsory membership
in a labor organization as a condition of employment . . . ,
includes by necessary implication a prohibition against forced
payment of initiation fees, union dues and assessments, or the
equivalent, by a worker to a labor organization as a condition
of employment . . . .49
In 1943 Kansas had enacted a statute which gave to employees
the right to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain
collectively and to engage in concerted activities, and it also guaran-
teed their right to refrain from any or all such activities. 0 Justice
Schroeder interpreted this enactment to mean that the right of em-
ployees to refrain from assisting labor organizations includes the
right to refrain from giving it financial assistance as well as personal
assistance.51 Since Kansas did not enact its constitutional amend-
ment until 1958, the legislature was undoubtedly aware of existing
laws and decisions and, according to the court, it must have decided
that it was unnecessary to include a more explicit provision, or that
to do so would be superfluous. The court stated: "The alternative
would require this court to declare that the constitutional amendment
serves no useful purpose at all. It would permit the appellees [the
" "Here the court is not confronted with a penal statute to be strictly
construed, but a remedial constitutional amendment to be liberally construed
to effectuate the purpose for which it was adopted." 188 Kan. at - , 360
P.2d 464.
"Ibid., citing Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17 (1954).
188 Kan. at - , 360 P.2d at 465. (Emphasis added.)
' Ibid.
"KAN€. Gnx. STAT. § 44-803 (1950).
81 188 Kan. at -, 360 P.2d 467.
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union] to circumvent its natural and logical interpretation."52  The
court therefore held that the agency shop was invalid under the
Kansas constitutional amendment. And, by refusing to review the
case, the United States Supreme Court left the matter as an open
question. But the problems attendant on the agency shop issue have
not been resolved by the Kansas decision, the Supreme Court or the
NLRB.
UNRESOLVED PROBLEM AREAS
One problem left unanswered is the status of the agency shop in
those states having right to work laws53 with no specific prohibition
concerning the payment of fees to a union (such as that in Indiana),
but minus the penalty clause found in the Indiana statute.54 If we
assume that the canons of statutory construction amount to more
than merely conventional judicial attitudes, what construction will
be placed on these statutes? Without any specific legislative intent
to guide them, it will depend upon the predilections of the state
courts-toward liberal or narrow construction-or on the court's
philosophy of labor relations.
Another problem of greater magnitude is whether a right to
work statute which specifically prohibits an agency shop arrangement
violates section 14(b) of the Labor Management Relations Act.
This is not a question to which state courts can give the final answer.
As Judge Kelley stated in the Indiana case:
The Labor Management Relations Act ... by section 14(b)
... specifically authorizes and recognizes the validity of Right
to Work Laws of the several states. Now, whether or not
such authorization and recognition would extend to or au-
thorize a state legislature to validly "outlaw" such "agency
shop" clauses would perhaps require and necessitate an ex-
tensive exploration of the doctrine of federal preemption
[sic] .... 55
52 Id. at - , 360 P.2d 466. (Emphasis is by the court.)
5 States having right to work constitutional amendments are: Arizona,
1946; Arkansas, 1947; Florida, 1944; Mississippi, 1960; Nebraska, 1946;
and South Dakota, 1946.
" IND. ANN. STAT. § 40-2705 (Supp. 1961).
" Meade Elec. Co. v. Hagberg, 129 Ind. App. 631, - , 159 N.E.2d 408,
411 (1959). This quotation does not. indicate, as has been suggested in
Jones, supra note 9, at 785, "that a statute barring an agency shop would be
invalid under sec. 14(b) of the NLRB, as amended .... " It simply indi-
cates the possibility that such a question might arise.
[Vol. 40
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Justice Schroeder examined the problem at some length in the
Kansas decision. In summary he found that inasmuch as there were
a number of specific state laws prohibiting payment to unions prior
to the enactment of section 14(b), Congress must have had these
statutes in mind when it took such action. He called particular
attention to the report of the House Managers, with reference to
section 13 of H.R. 3020 and section 14 of the conference committee
amendments:
Under the House bill there was included a new section
13 of the NLRA to assure that nothing in the Act was to be
construed as authorizing any closed shop, union shop, main-
tenance of membership, or any other form of compulsory
unionism agreement in any State where the execution of such
agreement would be contrary to State law.56
With this background and expressed intent of Congress to leave
the states free to prevent all forms of compulsory unionism, and
taking into consideration detailed state statutes, as well as the
broader constitutional amendments adopted by others such as Kan-
sas, 57 Justice Schroeder concluded that there is little question that
Congress and many state legislatures have construed the words
"membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment"
as including forced payments to unions.
Obviously, if this were not true and the "agency shop"
provision in a union-security agreement is not within the com-
pass of section 14(b), statutes in those states in which the
more detailed language has been used prohibiting forced pay-
ments to unions of dues, fees and other charges would fall by
their own weight."8
Since the unions are working for the repeal of right to work
laws in a number of states, this is the problem area that could con-
ceivably furnish the next test case, and since federal pre-emption
is involved, the United States Supreme Court would have to furnish
an answer.
Individual rights is another troublesome problem which many
r'93 CONG. REC. 6378 (1947). (Emphasis added.)
"' KAz. CoxsT. art. 15, § 12.
"Higgins v. Cardinal Mfg. Co., 188 Kan. 11, - , 360 P.2d 456, 468(1961).
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feel should be reviewed.59 To proponents of right to work legislation
it is incomprehensible that a man who has demonstrated his un-
willingness to join a union, who has never authorized a union to
negotiate and contract for him, who has not participated in such
negotiation or its preparation, or ratified its results, should be forced
to pay support money to that union. In other words, they do not
agree with the majority rule principle of collective bargaining. It
is hardly likely, however, after more than three decades of federal
legislation embodying the majority rule concept-and the subsequent
tests of constitutionality-that any court would find that the agency
shop abridged the rights of non-union employees.
By analogy to the political process, each employee, union and
non-union alike, who falls within the unit over which the elected
representative has jurisdiction, is subject to all provisions respecting
his employment upon which the representative and his employer
agree. Like the changes in law effected by the legislative branch
of government, changes in the employment agreement bilaterally
determined bind the employee to each change regardless of his indi-
vidual wishes in the matter.6" Thus, the majority rule in collective
bargaining is firmly established.
Section 302 of the Labor Management Relations Act" presents
another problem which might arise in connection with an agency
shop provision. This section prohibits employer contributions to
unions other than "money deducted from the wages of employees in
payment of membership dues in a labor organization." Here the
question is squarely presented: what constitutes membership in a
" William T. Harrison, Chairman of the National Right to Work Com-
mittee, wrote to Roger Blough concerning the agency shop provision in the
1960 steel contract: "It is difficult to understand why the steel companies saw
fit to impose upon fellow Americans the requirement that they must support
a private association whose services they do not seek. . . . We trust that
negotiators of subsequent contracts will exhibit more concern for individual
rights." The Durham Sun, Feb. 9, 1960, p. 2, col. 1.
80 See Weyand, Majority Ride in Collective Bargaining, 45 COLUAM. L.
Rv. 556, 561 (1945): "Nor can the employee by any individual contract
alter the rules governing his employment fixed by the collective agreement
entered into by the union elected by a majority of the employees in the unit
any more than a citizen by private contract can alter the laws enacted by
the legislature." The legislative adoption of the majority rule principle as
the central concept of the collective bargaining structure constitutes a com-
plete repudiation of all previous efforts to deal with the problem. In con-
trast to the concern of the common law with the assumed intent of each
employee, the majority rule principle makes the intent of any or all of the
individual employees immaterial.61 61 Stat. 157 (1957), 29 U.S.C. § 186(c) (4) (1958).
[Vol. 40
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labor organization? If it is determined that the forced payment of
dues and fees does not constitute membership, then any arrangement
for a universal check-off would involve the employer's deducting
dues from the wages of non-union employees and turning it over to
the union, which is forbidden. Inasmuch as section 302 carries a
penaltyprovision, enforceable by the United States Attorney General,
theemployer places himself in jeopardy of a criminal action. 2 On
the other hand, assuming that the majority rule in collective bar-
gaining is controlling, and further, that union membership and the
payment of dues are synonymous as far as the enforcement provi-
sions of the act are concerned, a problem could arise concerning the
voluntary individual written authorization for the check-off of union
dues. Since a man cannot be forced to agree to a check-off of his
dues, the union faces the problem of exacting such dues from an
employee hostile to the union without "restraining, coercing and
intimidating" such employee in his rights under the act.
On the surface, it appears that the threat of discharge for dues
delinquency would be sufficient. However, an interesting situation
existed from 1956 to 1959 in North Dakota which has twice ruled
that the agency shop is a valid form of union security under its right
to work law. In January 1956, the Attorney General of North
Dakota ruled that such an agreement, while valid, could not be used
as a basis for discharging or refusing to hire an employee who re-
fused to pay a union fee for the services and benefits he received
under the union contract.6" Therefore, the agency shop was un-
enforceable. In August of 1959 the North Dakota Attorney General
ruled again that the agency shop was legal and dues and fees could
be collected from non-union employees in the bargaining unit pro-
vided that such charges were based on the actual costs of repre-
sentation. 64
In Nebraska a contractual agreement for an agency, shop does
not constitute a misdemeanor, but any attempt to enforce it is un-
lawful since its purpose is illegal and a misdemeanor under the right
to work statute and the constitutional amendment.6 5 Under the
', See McConkey, supra note 8, at 151.
PH LAB. SERv. ND. 46,175 (Jan. 13, 1956).
"Id. at 46,175 (Aug. 24, 1959).
NEB. COxST. art. 15, § 13; NEB. REv. STAT. § 48-217 (1960); Lincoln
Fed. Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 149 Neb. 507, 31 N.W.2d
477 (1948), aft'd, 335 U.S. 525 (1949). For a discussion of the Nebraska
statute, see Swindler, The Right to Work, A Decade of Development, 36
NEB. L. REv. 276 (1957).
1962].
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
South Dakota right tO work law, a union cannot contract to become
the sole bargaining agent for all employees "including non-union, non-
consenting employees, working in the departments which it is trying
to organize." 6  However, an individual employee may voluntarily
agree to an agency shop arrangement, but reprisal by either the com-
pany or union against an employee refusing to give his consent
would violate the law. Ostensibly, it would also be a violation to
try to force the employee to live up to his voluntary agreement.
Another" facet of the problem concerns the amount that may
properly be charged non-union employees under an agency shop
arrangement for bona fide collective bargaining services. As indi-
cated above, th Attorney General of North Dakota stated that if,
as claimed by a union representative, all dues, assessments, and initia-
tion fees paid by union members are legitimate costs of bargaiiing
and representation furnished by the union to members and non-union
employees alike (only insurance, health and welfare benefits and
pensions not being part of such costs), and are used solely for such
purposes, then the union can base its charge to non-union employees
upon such dues, assessments, initiation fees and other charges which
are used only for union bargaining and representation. However,
the charges were not spelled out specifically.
In International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street,"' arising under
the 1951 amendment to the Railway Labor Act,6" the Georgia Su-
preme Court held that it was unconstitutional to compel a man to
contribute money through a union to support political or economic
programs which he opposes. In a similar case in North Carolina,70
the court reached a different conclusion. As a result of these con-
flicting opinions, the Street case went to the United States Supreme
Court71 which remanded the case to the Georgia court, but in its
remand order it decided that railroad unions could not support politi-
cal activities, against the expressed wishes of a dissenting employee,
with dues money exacted from him under a union shop contract.
The Georgia court was ordered to devise the specific remedy in this
case. In turn, the Georgia Supreme Court72 remanded the case to
15 S.D. CODE § 17.1101 (1960), LAB. REL. REP. S.D. 52:267 (Sept. 3,1958).
PH LAB. SERv. N.D. 46,175 (Jan. 13, 1956).
"8215 Ga. 27, 108 S.E.2d 796 (1959).
6o 64 Stat. 1238 (1951), 45 U.S.C. § 152(11) (1958).
"Allen v. Southern R.R., 249 N.C. 491, 107 S.E.2d 125 (1959).
' International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961).
International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 122 S.E.2d 220 (Ga. 1961).
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the trial court to try to devise a practical method of refuriding past
dues payments -and reducing future payments so -that dissenting
members contribute to the cost of collective .bargaining alone. But
if this could not be done, the lower court was told to enjoin the union
from all spending for political activity.. Until' these "legitimate
costs" of collective bargaining are spelled out in greater. detail, the
union can: approach the problem only on a trial and error basis.
CONCLUSION
At the present time there seems no doubt that the' agency sh!51
is a legal form of union security under the Labor Management Re-
lations Act. As to whether the agency shop is valid under state
right to work laws, both the Supreme Court of the United States
and the NLRB seem to leave this to the states to determine. How-
ever, among the state courts there is considerable confusion as to
whether section 14(b) of the federal statute grants to the states the
authority to outlaw the agency shop.
Currently, three right to work states-Indiana, Florida and
North Dakota-none of which specifically prohibits support pay-
ments, interpret their statutes to allow the agency shop. Of these,
only Indiana is heavily industrialized and heavily unionized. Ari-
zona, Kansas, Nebraska, Nevada and South Dakota-more agri-
cultural and less unionized, but similarly silent as to support money
payments-hold the agency shop invalid under their right to work
provisions. Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Iowa, Mississippi, North
Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah and Virginia
specifically outlaw the payment of dues, fees and charges to a labor
organization as a condition of employment. The Louisiana law,
which was repealed in 1956 for all except agricultural employees,
also contains a specific prohibition of the agency shop.
There is still one aspect of the agency shop issue that has not
been explored but deserves some mention. Viewed in the larger
perspective of the long run trend of unions to gain a greater degree
of security, the agency shop appears more as a "tempest in a teapot"
than a major issue. As a stop-gap measure on the road to greater
security-a temporary detour around the right to work road-block
until it can be removed by outright repeal-it will undoubtedly work
for the unions. However, if the unions lose sight of their major
goal, and the agency shop becomes an end in itself, then it could work
19621
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against them, weaken their fight for security and dissipate their
energies and financial resources which might be spent more profit-
ably in organizational campaigns.
. While repeal efforts are underway in most of the right to work
states, the unions have not been very successful in their endeavors.
Since the southern states comprise the major right to work bloc, with
their tradition of anti-unionism, the outlook for repeal is not bright.
Meantime, the agency shop is outlawed successfully in these states
so that, unless the unions can overturn these statutes under section
14(b), union security in the South is a lost cause.
